

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MBFR VIENNA 0385

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JULY 15 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

1. AT THE ONE HUNDRED TENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON JULY 15, CHAIRED BY SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV), HUNGARIAN REP (FODOR) DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IT CONTRASTED THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS WITH THE EASTERN ONE AND INCLUDED A COMMENT THAT THE WEST'S DELAY IN RESPONDING TO THE EAST'S JUNE 10 DATA MOVE RAISED DOUBTS AS TO WESTERN INTENTIONS INSINSISTING FOR SO LONG THAT EASTERN DATA WAS NECESSARY. FODOR ALSO IMPLIED, BUT DID NOT STATE, THAT THERE WAS ROUGH PARITY BETWEEN THE FORCES OF EAST AND WEST IN THE AREA. THE MAIN POINTS OF HIS STATEMENT WERE:

A. WESTERN INSISTENCE ON ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS AND THE UNWILLINGNESS OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, OTHER THAN THE US, TO MAKE CONCRETE COMMITMENTS TO
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REDUCE THEIR FORCES EVEN IN A SECOND STAGE CONTINUE TO

BLOCK PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

B. THE OMISSION OF AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FROM REDUCTIONS, EXCEPT ON THE LIMITED, ONE-TIME BASIS PROPOSED BY THE WEST LAST DECEMBER 16, IS ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT DEFECT OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

C. IF THE WEST RECIPROCATED THE EAST'S PREPAREDNESS FOR REASONABLE COMPROMISE, AS EVIDENCED BY EASTERN ACTIONS OF FEBRUARY 19 AND JUNE 10, THERE WOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

D. INSTEAD, THE WEST PREFERS TO BELITTLE THESE EASTERN INITIATIVES RATHER THAN RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THEM.

E. WHAT IS MORE, THE WEST SEEMS EVEN TO BE GOING BACK ON SOME OF ITS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS.

F. FOR EXAMPLE, TO EASTERN ASTONISHMENT, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE CALLED THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 19 PROPOSAL ONLY A PROCEDURAL CHANGE IN THE EASTERN APPROACH WHEN THAT PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR REDUCTIONS BY SOVIET AND US FORCES ONLY IN A FIRST STAGE, SOMETHING ON WHICH THE WEST HAS REPEATEDLY INSISTED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

G. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO REDUCE SOVIET FORCES BY 2-3 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BEFORE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHOSE FORCES COMPRISE 75 PERCENT OF ALL NATO FORCES IN THE AREA, TAKE ANY REDUCTIONS WOULD, IF IMPLEMENTED, HAVE MAJOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, AND CANNOT BE TERMED A PROCEDURAL STEP.

H. ALSO, AFTER REPEATEDLY CALLING FOR DATA IN ORDER TO GIVE CONCRETE FORM TO THE TALKS, THE WEST HAS NOT HASTENED TO RESPOND WITH COMPARABLE DATA OF ITS OWN NOW THAT THE EAST HAS TABLED FIGURES ON WARSAW

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PACT MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

I. SUCH BEHAVIOR RAISES DOUBTS REGARDING THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND CONFIRMS THE JUSTIFIED NATURE OF THE EASTERN REQUIREMENT THAT THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME GENERAL BUT CLEARLY FORMULATED OBLIGATIONS WITH REGARD TO REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND STAGE.

J. HUNGARY SUPPORTS, AS VITAL TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EASTERN FLANK STATES, THE POSITION THAT SOVIET FORCES, WHICH CONSTITUTE THE HEART OF WARSAW PACT STRENGTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE, SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED IN THE ABSENCE OF GUARANTEES THAT NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO REDUCE THEIR FORCES.

K. THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED BERLIN CONFERENCE OF SOCIALIST AND WORKERS PARTIES OF EUROPE DEMONSTRATED THE READINESS OF ALL THE EASTERN GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES, TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

L. THE WEST HAS, UP UNTIL NOW, NOT EXHIBITED ANY SIMILAR READINESS.

M. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT THE WEST CONTINUES TO INSIST ON THEIR UNJUSTIFIED DEMAND FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS.

N. IN A SITUATION WHERE THERE ARE NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF THE FORCES ON EITHER SIDE, ONLY EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES CAN LEAD TO AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME THAT WOULD NOT DISTURB THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE NOR DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY.

O. ANY APPROACH WHICH SEEKS TO REDUCE ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, WHILE LEAVING OTHERS

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UNLIMITED, WOULD NEITHER REMOVE THE THREAT INHERENT IN THE CONCENTRATION OF MODERN POWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE NOR PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN THE AREA.

P. THE WESTERN OFFER OF DECEMBER 16 TO REDUCE A CERTAIN PART OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WAS MANIFESTLY INSUFFICIENT BUT NEVERTHELESS A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

Q. IN CONTRAST, EASTERN PROPOSALS TO REDUCE ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, INCLUDING NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, POSSESSED BY ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WOULD EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER SECURITY FOR ALL STATES, INCLUDING THE SO-CALLED FLANK STATES.

R. THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE REMAIN
COMMITTED TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE HUNGARIAN DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO DO
EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A RESULT.

2. THE FULL TEXT OF THE HUNGARIAN STATEMENT FOLLOWS
BY AIRGRAM.RESOR

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